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REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE.
Boston, January 31, 1941.
To the Honorable the Senate and House of Representatives
in General Court Assembled.
In accordance with section 18 of chapter 486 of the
Acts of 1909, the Finance Commission of the City of
Boston submits its annual report for the year 1940.
I. ORGANIZATION OF THE COMMISSION.
There were no changes in the membership of the
Commission during 1940. Mr. Ehas F. Shamon, who
was originally appointed on December 13, 1939, to
serve an unexpired term, was reappointed for a term of
five years on August 21, 1940.
II. APPROPRIATION AND EXPENDITURES.
In accordance with the provisions of chapter 486
of the Acts of 1909, as amended, the Mayor and City
Council appropriated S5,000 for the salary of the
Chairman and $45,000 for the general expenses of
the Commission. The City Government made special
appropriations totahng $31,500 for the investigation of
the Boston Elevated Railway Company. All of the
expenses for the investigation of the Boston Elevated
Railway Company from its beginning in August, 1939,
to May 1, 1940, were paid out of the regular Finance
Commission appropriation. Expenses for the period
from May 1 to December 14, 1940, were paid from
special appropriations granted by the City Govern-
ment. Expenditures from December 14, 1940, to the
end of the fiscal year were charged to the Finance
Commission's regular appropriation, to which the Mayor
and City Auditor transferred an additional sum of
(3)
4$1,500 on December 31, 1940. The total spent in 1940
for this investigation from these sources is divided,
therefore, as follows:
1940 Regular Finance Commission Appropriation, S10,393 03
1940 Special Appropriations and Transfers . . 31,076 30
1940 Total Expenditure $41,469 33
The classification of the Commission's entire expend-
itures for 1940 follows:
Permanent employees . . . . . $32,210 57
Printing and binding 818 02
Transportation of persons 40 20
Light and power 115 31
Rent 5,111 25
Communication 384 65
Cleaning 72 00
Stenographic, stencils 6 00
Fees 21 00
Photographing and blueprinting .... 50
Miscellaneous items and repairs .... 33 00
Office equipment 136 56
Library equipment 123 00
Office supplies 479 16
Ice 43 50
Miscellaneous supplies 12 25
Special investigations 41,469 33
Total expended $81,076 30
Amount appropriated in accordance with statute, $50,000 00
Additional appropriation for special investigations, 3 1 ,500 00
Total credit $81,500 00
Total expended 81,076 30
Balance unexpended $423 70
III. WORK OF THE COMMISSION.
In 1940 the Finance Commission continued the policy
of informing itself of contemplated executive acts before
the City becomes committed to expenditure. Suitable
inquiry into details was made to the extent which the
facilities of the Commission permitted. Whenever the
inquiry produced information important to the proper
handling of city business, it was promptly offered to
those in charge of city administration. Included in
this type of work was the examination of
1. orders for purchase of materials, supplies and
equipment,
2. orders for work without contracts,
3. specifications and contracts and methods of award
of them.
The Commission has also continued to inspect the
construction of public works, and the repair and main-
tenance of city plant; also to co-operate with many city
agencies in consideration of methods and means of
administration. It is significant to record that not
only has the Commission's co-operation apparently been
welcomed when offered, but that it has often been
solicited. More and more in each year departmental
officials are recognizing that the Finance Commission
was created to help them, and are looking to the Com-
mission for help.
The amount of labor entailed in a comprehensive
examination of city work may be appreciated from the
fact that approximately 75,000 orders for work or pur-
chase come to the City Auditor yearly. Under the
city's administrative system these orders must be
approved by the City Auditor before issuance to a
vendor. The Auditor approves issuance only after
establishment of the right to spend for the purpose
described, and if satisfied that the prices to which the
City is committed by the orders are proper. It is in
the latter consideration that the Finance Commission's
work is most important.
Although the formal reports made by the Commission
during 1940 were not so numerous as in some other
years, they were the result of long studies, and made up
in substance for the deficiency in numbers. With proper
6co-operation between the Finance Commission and
the city administrators, the Commission's work becomes
mostly that of preventing unwise outlay and improving
departmental efficiency. Formal reports are necessary
only to reveal the disclosures of comprehensive surveys.
The facilities of the Finance Commission are such
that these formal reports must be few in number in each
year, if the very important work entailed in the exami-
nation of executive orders before issuance is not to be
neglected.
The Finance Commission offers the following com-
ments on some of the more important undertakings
during the year
:
1. The Boston Elevated Railway Inquiry.
Accountants and engineers have been engaged during
most of the past year in a painstaking examination of
the books and records of the Boston Elevated Company
under the direction of the Finance Commission's special
counsel, Timothy F. Callahan. The results of this
examination will be made known shortly.
2. The County Institutions.
Within the past few years reports alleging the exist-
ence of scandalous conditions in the Suffolk County
correctional institutions have seriously disturbed the
public's peace of mind. Waste, extravagance, loose
control or lack of control, favoritism in treatment of
prisoners, and many other charges were made by one
group of investigators or another. They produced a
temporary sensation. Much was spoken, much was
written about them. The man in the street, the speaker
on the public platform, writers in the local press and
even in the national magazines all took a fling at them.
Before long, however, new sensations replaced them in
public discussion. Even reports of scandalous condi-
tions in institutions of other counties and other states
helped to take the spotlight away from the Suffolk
7County institutions. The Finance Commission believes
that sufficient time has now elapsed to permit of a more
objective discussion.
To judge the administrative quality of any institution
by the cold figures of its expenditure is likely to lead to
false impressions. In comparison of costs some county
institutions in Massachusetts show up much better than
others. It does not necessarily follow, however, that
the reason for the difference in cost is that the adminis-
trators in those institutions which show up best in
per capita expenditure try any harder to manage well
or with more honest purpose than do those in the in-
stitutions which show up less favorably. Size, location,
area, character of inmates, industrial activity, average
length of stay of inmates, physical condition of inmates
during term of imprisonment, and physical condition
of the prison plant itself affect vitally eventual cost
quite as much as the capabilities of administrators and
the degree of inclination to provide good management.
Nevertheless, the managers of some county correctional
institutions appear to be doing an effective job at low
cost. The example set by them should be copied, and
the good results obtained should be the objective of the
managers of all others.
The Finance Commission and others have revealed
that the House of Correction for Suffolk County at
Deer Island is far from being a model institution. The
Commission contends that under present laws, customs,
and political conditions, and in its present physical
condition it can never be a model institution.
The responsibiUty for management in this institution
is complicated by a spread of authority among many
official agencies. Under general county law, a warden
or a keeper is given charge of each jail. In Suffolk
County the corresponding official is known as the
''Master of the House of Correction." However, the
''Master" in Suffolk County is subordinate to a Boston
Penal Institutions Commissioner who is the responsible
head of a city department the major function of which
8is the operation of the House of Correction. The Master
of the House of Correction, therefore, can administer
the affairs of his institution only to the extent which the
Penal Institutions Commissioner permits. The ]Mayor
of the City appoints the Penal Institutions Commis-
sioner and can dismiss him at will; therefore, the
Mayor's desires in House of Correction management
must be reckoned with by both the Penal Institutions
Commissioner and the iMaster. The City Council has
joint authority with, the ]\Iayor in making appropriation
for the House of Correction. The Council also has the
duty to inspect it from time to time. AATien performing
either of these functions, the City Council has broad
power of investigation. Therefore, the City Council's
desires in House of Correction administration must also
be reckoned with by the Master. State officialdom
comes into the picture. The State Commissioner of
Correction has complete control of industr}^ at the House
of Correction and has supervisory authorit\^ over other
details of operation. The State Commissioner, there-
fore, must be reckoned with by the IMaster. Such
division of control makes efficient administration diffi-
cult if not impossible.
Another cause of the serious situation on the Island
lies in the character of the inmates. The courts decide
what convicted persons will be sent to the House of
Correction, and the Master must take whoever is sent
there whether the person really belongs there or not.
The Finance Commission has repeatedly revealed that
the type of persons committed to the Deer Island House
of Correction accounts in no small measure for its un-
favorable operating record and for its poor results in
reforming criminals. The statutes, supposedly, deter-
mine the t3^pes to be sent to particular jails. Prison
officials of long experience have claimed for years that
almost half the inmates at Deer Island belong in other
institutions, some in State Prison, some in state hos-
pitals. This is often due to the fact that judges or
juries in Suffolk County convict for a lesser degree of
9crime than was apparently committed. In many such
instances a person who might be classified as a dangerous
criminal is thus sent to an institution which was not
developed to handle a case of this character.
Justice tempered with mercy now decrees that unless
conviction is for a very serious crime, or the convicted
person is a persistent offender, he must be given another
chance. The present workings of our highly developed
probation system, and the legaUzed custom of suspending
sentence eliminates the actual commitment to Deer
Island of the majority of light offenders. Because of
these factors too large a proportion of those forced to
sojourn in the Deer Island House of Correction for any
great length of time are not of the type which this simple
" workhouse was intended to contain. Yet, Suffolk
County House of Correction has only the ordinary
facilities of " Si workhouse '\ and has little real work for
all because of the large number of inmates and the
peculiar condition of the plant.
Serious offenders and mentally weak malefactors
require a great deal more care, and cost more to keep
than light offenders. They must be more closely
guarded. Their prison comfort must be given more
attention. M«n undergoing long periods of penal
servitude, with its prospect of facing trial for other
crimes when the current sentence is served, are less
likely to be satisfied with conditions less than perfect
than those who are there for a short stay only. Dis-
satisfaction with prison fare, or warmth, or service of
various kinds is always likely to result in serious trouble.
It requires greater financial outlay, therefore, to keep
hardened offenders peaceful, and sick prisoners satisfied.
Yet the physical condition of the Deer Island House
of Correction has been unsatisfactory for many years.
The buildings are old and scattered, and have been
poorly kept because funds have not been ample for
suitable maintenance. Prisoners of all types are mingled
without proper segregation. When the institution was
constructed, it was not foreseen that the dangerous
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character of so many inmates would ever make it
necessary to segregate the population by types, and
house and work and guard them accordingly. There-
fore, facilities for such segregation were not provided.
Boston taxpayers are imposed upon by special legis-
lation which requires them alone to bear the cost of
operation of the House of Correction of Suffolk County
despite the fact that other municipalities make use of it.
The Charles Street Jail is another Suffolk County
institution, serving a purpose very similar to the in-
tended purpose of the House of Correction, yet its
direct management is in other hands. Within a few
years the Finance Commission made a survey of its
administration. While no evidence of scandalous con-
ditions was found at that time, management methods
were not of the best. Although report of that survey
was made a public record and was sent to official agencies
having responsibility in one way or another for the
management of the Jail, the danger signal it contained
was not heeded. The now partially forgotten jail
scandal of 1939 might have been averted had adequate
attention been given to the disclosures by the Finance
Commission of flaws in its management methods.
When public interest in this 1939 Jail scandal was at
its height, a controversy arose between city and state
officials as to who was responsible. To many informed
observers, it was like ''the pot calling the kettle black^\
Several had control or jurisdiction in some form or
other, but all had neglected to exercise it.
In this situation the Finance Commission made an
attempt to obtain action which would result in eliminat-
ing the possibility of a repetition of the situation. The
Commission made an exhaustive study of the statutes
relating to management. It was extremely difficult, if
not impossible, to analyze and reconcile the numerous
statutory enactments relating to the subject. Many
officials had been given supervisory power over this
institution, and this fact was used as excuse by each
of them for any failure to do his duty. The present
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conglomeration of statutes relating to the Jail is the
result of one hundred years of tinkering here and there
with the law.
There is no question but what the laws need revision,
codification, and clarification. Any one of three public
agencies, viz., the City Law Department, the State
Attorney General's Office, or the State Department of
Correction, might properly assume it to be its duty to
undertake this revision. None, however, has moved in
that direction. Governor Saltonstall has now begun
action along this line b}^ reference of the report of the
Finance Commission thereto to the Legislature.
The Finance Commission believes that if the state is
not to acquire the Deer Island House of Correction,
there should be an entire reorganization of the control
of the Charles Street Jail and the House of Correction.
Both should be operated by one and the same agency.
Such a reorganization can only come by way of a
revision of the laws relating to them.
3. Meridian Street Bridge.
The Finance Commission has spent considerable time
and energy during the past two 3^ears in efforts to obtain
reasonable improvement in the bothersome conditions
relating to the ancient bridge between East Boston and
Chelsea known as the ''Meridian Street Bridge." This
bridge has been a part of a main highway to Boston
from Chelsea for almost a century.
It was originally built in 1856 and much of the
original structure is still in use. A temporary draw was
built in 1912 and that also is still in use.
The poor condition of the structure and the difficulty
it presents to safe navigation through the draw^ have
been causes of annoyance for many years.
City bridge officials have been worried by the fear
that parts of it might collapse. Ordinarily, fifteen years
is about as long as it is safe to use a temporary draw
bridge. This temporary draw is now twentv-nine years
old.
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Heavy use is made of the bridge by ordinary vehicular
and pedestrian traffic, and also by the trolley transpor-
tation companies which have served Chelsea. The
main trolley lines from Chelsea to Boston make the
crossing here to be routed through the East Boston
trolley tunnel to Boston Proper.
Waterbound transportation in Chelsea Creek is ex-
tensive and serves many oil refineries and storage plants.
Shipping interests have had justifiable cause for com-
plaint in the situation. Safe passage through the draw-
span of the bridge has been difficult, though few accidents
have occurred. Navigators, however, have complained
that the danger of accident is greater than they should
reasonably be expected to encounter.
Local war department engineers brought the situa-
tion to a head by ordering the City to provide a new and
wider horizontal clearance at this point in the Creek.
In substance, this order meant one of two things.
Either the present bridge must be razed and not re-
placed, or must be replaced by a bridge of a type which
would cost much more than the City of Boston can
afford to pay.
The Finance Commission encouraged the Mayor to
seek modification of the war department's order. The
Commission enlisted the cooperation of organizations
and individuals interested in civic betterment in an
effort to convince the department that the physical
condition of the present bridge can be improved and the
difficulty of navigation in the Chelsea Creek at that
point can be eliminated by a less expensive method
than that called for by the order.
The combined forces, thus organized, secured a reopen-
ing of the matter which took the form of a further hear-
ing at which the City's case could be presented. The
hearing was held and at that time PubUc Works De-
partment officials offered several alternative plans, any
one of which would cost much less to execute and would
give a measure of safety both to the users of the highway
and to the navigators in the Creek.
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When all who desired had expressed their views, it
was decided that city engineers and war department
engineers would confer "in chambers" and work out a
solution satisfactory to all parties to the situation.
There the matter still rests. There have been no con-
ferences on this matter since the date of the hearing,
December 17. Other matters considered of more im-
portance to the National Defense Program have super-
seded it in discussion between city and federal agencies.
A drastic order, compliance with which might entail
expenditure of millions, therefore, still faces the City.
City administrators have often complained that or-
ganizations interested in civic betterment confine their
efforts to criticism of city expenditure. In this par-
ticular situation, it was the united representations made
by the civic agencies more than anything else which
created the opportunity for the City to obtain a com-
promise with the War Department. Since the original
order is still outstanding, the next move is now up to
the city administrators.
One consideration which the Finance Commission
believes the city administration should keep well in
mind in negotiations with the War Department is that
no large sum of money should be invested in any make-
shift plan. Such an alleviation of the present situation
will only make certain that the City will be facing the
same situation all over again within a year or two.
Because of the locus of the bridge, and its importance
as a communicating artery between facilities needed for
National Defense, the Finance Commission has sug-
gested that the City of Boston seek as an element in a
suitable solution financial aid from all beneficiaries of a
bridge at this point. The Federal Government, the
State of Massachusetts, the municipalities along the
Creek, and the oil companies which make almost
exclusive use of Chelsea Creek, all have vital interest in
the situation. The possibility of obtaining financial
assistance from all of these interests has not been suffi-
ciently explored. The Commission believes that adop-
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tion of any definite plan to strengthen the Meridian
Street Bridge and to ease navigation in Chelsea Creek
should depend on who is going to pay for it.
4. Centralization of City Laundry Work.
The annual laundry bill of the City of Boston runs
well into six figures. It consists of many items of
expenditure, such as pay rolls for operators of laundries,
bills for purchase and maintenance of equipment, for
maintenance and repair of buildings, and for trucking,
as well as bills from private launderers for cleaning
towels, coats, uniforms, bedding, blankets, etc.
Each city and county institution operates its own
laundry plant. The work of each plant is confined
to the laundry of the institution of which it is a part.
Other city departments pay private contractors for
laundry work in large or small amounts. In some
instances the work is given to the lowest bidder in
public competition. In others it is given without
competition to the most influential salesman who
solicits it.
Complaints often reached the Finance Commission
that some city or county laundry plants were inade-
quate, or were little used; that some were unduly
expensive to operate or were in a dilapidated condition.
Competitive laundrymen complained that prices for
work given out without competition were excessive,
and that no effort was made to obtain the best prices
by obtaining competition for the consolidated business
of the City.
None of these complaints was of merely recent origin.
Some of them were pressed so strongly a decade ago
that when a new laundry plant was being planned for
the City Hospital, it was decided to make room in the
plant for not only a consolidation of the laundry work
of the City Hospital and all its divisions, but to take
on the work of some other city departments. The
plant was built accordingly, but no consolidation of
15
work followed. The new hospital laundry handles
only the laundry of the main hospital building, yet
complaint still comes that the cost is greater than ever,
and that the laundry service is inadequate. Hospital
executives and laundry executives have at different
times and places blamed each other for the situation.
The traditional hospital custom of divided authority
has prevailed here also.
Because of the volume of complaint relating to the
laundry business of the City generally early in 1940
the Finance Commission undertook to find a remedy.
The Mayor's Survey Committee had sponsored a
survey of the city laundry business by a recognized
expert in laundry operation. He had reported that,
by a transfer of laundry machinery, from institutions
where it was not needed or was not giving maximum
service, to more advantageous locations, by the purchase
of some new equipment, and by a general reorganization
of the laundry work, including the application of the
city hospital plant to the use for which it was intended
by its planners, substantial savings could be made and
service complaints eliminated. He reported that an
expenditure of $114,000 for reorganization and new
equipment would effect an annual saving of $49,000.
The Finance Commission tried to obtain action on
this report by sponsoring a conference with the Mayor,
the Survey Committee, the expert who had made a
study for the Survey Committee, and one retained by
the City Hospital executives. It was the unanimous
conclusion of this conference that the city hospital
laundry could be expanded to include the work of all
its own divisions and the work of some other depart-
ments. However, the question of who would operate
the expanded laundry was never satisfactorily settled.
The Finance Commission contended that, since the
city hospital executives had proven incapable of pro-
viding satisfactory laundry service for its own needs,
the control of this plant should be vested in some other
department or official, preferably the Park Commis-
16
sioner, because he had furnished the laundry service to
his department in a satisfactory manner.
Hospital executives interposed objection to the whole
plan. Specious arguments were offered against it, the
most serious of which was that the mingling of hospital
laundry with that of other departments would spread
disease. Laundry experts, including the expert em-
ployed by the hospital executives, disputed this claim.
Experience in many outside hospitals has already dis-
proved it. Experience in the Boston City Hospital
disproved it because the present hospital laundry has
laundered the linen used by patients with every variety
of disease without having spread infection. Neverthe-
less, this attitude of the Hospital Trustees slowed up
efforts to obtain the improvement sought.
Another expert was later brought into the picture by
the Survey Committee. Whereas the first expert
showed how $49,000 per year could be saved by an
outlay of $114,000, the second one showed how $110,000
could be saved by an expenditure of $45,000. In either
case the saving would pay the cost of new equipment in
short time.
Some improvement has resulted from the Finance
Commission's efforts. Some institutions have been
given machinery which they badly needed, and which
they could utilize to better advantage than its previous
possessor. However, the Commission's main objective,
namely, to centralize laundry work in the city hospital
plant, which is capable of handling much more work if
properly organized, has not yet been achieved.
5. The Police Department.
The Finance Commission made two reports relating
to police cost during the last year. In the first, the
Commission confirmed the oft expressed opinion that
Boston police cost is high when compared with the cost
in the other large cities of the country, though it revealed
that it does not necessarily follow from this fact that
police cost in Boston is unjustifiably high.
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In the second report, however, the Finance Com-
mission disclosed that there are many opportunities for
readjustment of the man power in the Boston Police
Department which would reduce the total police cost.
What prompted the Finance Commission to make
this survey was the request of the Police Commissioner
for a sizable increase in patrolmen. The validity of
his claim was dependent on the contention made by him
and his predecessors that the all-time high of 2,149
patrolmen found in 1930 was the proper quota and the
number to which he was entitled.
Historical analysis shows the weakness of this con-
tention. Such an analysis discloses that from the
beginning of the single commissionership in 1906 the
number of patrolmen had rapidly increased until the
all-time high of 2,149 was reached in 1930. Only then
did anything like reorganization and efficient assignment
of men take place. From 1930 on, the Department
operated successfully with less men because thought
had been given and steps taken to modernizing police
technique. Thus it appears that the organization
changes in the Department greatly reduced the number
necessary to staff the Department.
Furthermore, as the survey of the Police Department's
actual operation progressed, the full realization of the
relation of personnel needs to organization and program
became more and more obvious. Examination of the
assignment of every man in the Department revealed
that there are certain structural defects in the organiza-
tion, and that many activities on the work program of
the Department cannot be called proper police work,
yet absorb much man power.
Nevertheless, many people want some specific num-
ber set as the number of patrolmen necessary for the
needs of the Department. Such a thing is impossible
to work out at this time. In the first place, there is no
such thing as a formula for determining adequate
patrol strength; secondly, and this is most important,
not even a proper minimum or maximum can be set so
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long as the Department carries on a work program
which goes beyond the proper scope of police work.
Reductions in the number of patrolmen will result
from trimming the present program down to actual
protective patrol needs. Such reductions will be further
increased by adoption of certain suggestions contained
in the report, namely: that respective functions of the
hierarchy of officials in the Department bear a closer
relation to their titles and that certain defects caused by
an overlapping and duplication of functions be corrected.
The Commission suggested that it might be a good
plan to adopt the policy of periodic rotation of the man
power. The police officials have always boasted that
theirs is a military organization. That being so, mili-
tary methods should prevail. One policy which military
organizations have found necessary to discipline, edu-
cation, efficiency, and good order, is the policy of rotating
officers periodically. It might promote efficiency in
the Police Department to try it. It might well result
in less cost.
The Finance Commission has analyzed the Police
Department assignments and indicated the necessary
improvements. It now remains for the Police Depart-
ment to ^'see the light. Many outside and inside the
Police Department have indicated whole-hearted sym-
pathy with the objective of the Commission in this
study, which was to try to discover ways by which the
police cost can be reduced. The demand for reduction
is more or less unorganized, but is nevertheless sub-
stantial, and will continue until better results are shown.
One feature of the Commission's findings which has
been discussed very freely by the public since issuance
of the report relates to the ^'junior police." Some
competent observers hold the opinion that the various
activities of this organization are not such as a police
department should sponsor and manage. Some also
hold the opinion that, if substantial results of the kind
desired are to be obtained by police management of this
organization, it will require a much larger personnel of
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police officers than the city can afford to provide. On
the other hand, opinion favorable to continuance of the
present ''junior police'' program by the police depart-
ment has been expressed by others.
The Finance Commission presented the facts about it
for the purpose of directing public attention to it, and
to provide wide discussion of it. As is true of almost
every kind of service the city attempts to give, and of
many other kinds which are advocated from time to
time, the objective of the ''junior police" program is a
good one. However, the proper place for it in govern-
mental administration, the ultimate cost of it, the pos-
sibility of obtaining results which will justify the cost,
and the ability of the city to pay for the cost should be
carefully considered.
The Police Commissioner expressed entire satis-
faction with the Finance Commission's discussion of
the "junior police" before the report was given to
the public.
6. Inventory of City Equipment, Supplies and
Materials.
Three years ago the Finance Commission revealed
in a report to the Mayor the necessity of installing an
inventory system for the City. It must have surprised
many to learn in that way that the City of Boston
was spending miUions every year for the purchase of
supplies, materials and equipment without knowing
what actually happened to such purchases. It was
not only that the accounting methods of the City did
not contain a modern inventory system, but that it
had no inventory system at all.
There was no place where anyone could go except
to the bills on file in the Auditor's Office to obtain
reliable information of what had been purchased.
There was no centralized record of what had been con-
sumed in city work, or remained the property of the
City. The Auditor, without funds or facilities to make
an actual inventory, had for years made a list of the
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equipment owned by the City a feature of his annual
report. This hst was made up each year and furnished
to the auditor by the departments individually. No
use was made of it other than pubhcation in the Auditor's
annual report. Some department officials attempted to
furnish accurate lists. Others were less conscientious.
Yet no question was ever raised as to the accuracy of the
lists furnished, and no comparison of the lists from year
to year was ever made for the purpose of ascertaining
whether the City still possessed all the property which
it should have. There was no reference to the current
list when new purchases were sought.
In showing the need of a modern inventory system
the Finance Commission used the striking illustration
of one city department buying a steam roller while
steam rollers were rusting in the yards of other depart-
ments. Similar disregard of opportunity to obtain
equipment without new purchase was often repeated.
At the time of the Finance Commission report, tools —
large and small— were being purchased by the thou-
sands for W. P. A. projects as well as for regular city
maintenance. There was no system to account for the
use or disappearance of any of it. If a department
head wanted to know what equipment was actually
existent in his department, it was a special task to
investigate and count and list. He had no other
means of knowing what should be there. It is well
know^n that often in the past some contractors were
spared the necessity of buying their own equipment
by having access to city equipment.
The City Auditor began the compilation of this
long needed accessory to businesslike management, an
inventory, by directing a W. P. A. project to list all
articles of furniture and office equipment and to label
them as city property. He installed a system of
recording new^ purchases of that type of articles, and
elimination of it b}^ any means. This system will pro-
vide a record of the property the City possesses at any
particular time only if care is taken to maintain its
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accuracy. Conceivably it can reduce city operative
costs if use is made of it when funds are requested for
departmental maintenance and requisitions for pur-
chase are being scrutinized. It must be available to,
and used by budget making authority, and purchasing
authority.
A reliable inventory of consumable supplies and
materials is no less important. A step in the direction
of providing one has been taken, but to date it has
amounted to little more than a step. An accounting
firm has been hired to prepare a W. P. A. project to
lay out and install a system. The local representatives
of the W. P. A. have eventually approved the form of
the project. That is as far as it has progressed.
Approval by higher officials of the W. P. A. in Wash-
ington has not yet been forthcoming.
It is estimated that the installation of a reliable
inventory system for the City of Boston will cost upwards
of $100,000, which it is hoped the Federal Government
will advance.
Snow Removal.
The blizzard which visited Boston on St. Valentine
Day of 1940, generally regarded as the worst snow-
storm the City has experienced in the last half century,
provided a severe test of the city's snow removal forces.
On the whole they failed to meet the test.
After making due allowance for the lack of warning
of the storm, the heavy fall of snow, and the gale which
accompanied it, resulting in the worst piling up of snow
on streets and sidewalks witnessed since the blizzard of
1898, the fact nevertheless remains that clearance was
unnecessarily slow and its cost unwarrantedly high.
For the first time in decades business in the City
' Proper was completely suspended for almost twenty-
four hours after the snow ceased falling. For many
days more, merchants, shoppers, artisans, men of all
professions, had the greatest difficulty in moving about
in their ordinary pursuits. The streets were practically
impassable. After three or four days, the central
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business areas were cleared sufficiently to allow com-
plete resumption of business, but the residential streets
were clogged with snow piles for a week or ten days
thereafter. Many thousands of dollars were paid to
shovelers who did little shoveling, for trucks which
could not plow, for shovel equipment which disappeared
almost as soon as issued to workers.
The city administrative organization was unprepared
for such a visitation of nature. The meager forces ordi-
narily assembled to clear up after a storm were totally
inadequate for this emergency. Even such as they
were, they were not brought into use until too late to
accomplish quick relief.
To cope with any sizeable storm a comprehensive
plan of attack must be carefully prepared in advance,
and executed in the emergency with swift and sure
judgment if the public interest is to be adequately safe-
guarded. The Finance Commission foimd that at the
time of last year's storm there existed no carefully
worked out method of attack which could be put into
operation immediately after the intensity of the storm
was realized. Furthermore in many important respects,
the judgment of city officials in directing clearance was
seri-ously at fault.
The Finance Commission made a careful survey of
the conditions the City faced and how they were met,
and reported its findings. This report emphasized that
the city administration must immediately work out a
plan which would prevent a repetition of such an experi-
ence and offered many suggestions in relation thereto.
Eventually, a plan embracing a more scientific organiza-
tion of the city forces and a more reliable method of
obtaining assistance was developed. Although the sug-
gestions of the Finance Commission were adopted only
in part, nevertheless the Commission was satisfied that,
with capable supervision and with the exercise of good
judgment by directing authorities, the new plan would
make prompt clearance possible after any storm Boston
is likely to experience.
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A test was given to the new system in the ten-to-
twelve-inch snowfall of January 24 and 25 of this year.
The results were unsatisfactory. Fortunately for busi-
ness and industry in the City, the storm came at the
week end and, when business would naturally be on a
holiday. Fortunately also, what wind there was with
the storm did not force the snowfall into huge packed
drifts as was the case in the February 14, 1940,
storm.
The plowing of streets was ordered early enough,
but the actual plowing was inadequate. The start of
the removal was unreasonably delayed. The result
was that there was complete clearance within a short
time only in a few spots in the central business section.
In the majority of the streets in the central business
section and generally in the residential sections for
several days people were forced to plod through four
to eight inches of heavy snow. The Finance Com-
mission believes that this condition might have been
avoided by a better handling of the task of clearance.
There has been much complaint that trucks with plows
attached were run over the same street many times
without making much of a path; that on many streets
the path made was wide enough to permit passage for
only one vehicle at a time. There are many stories
that plowmen kept the plow blade so high that after
the first trip through a street the plow did not thereafter
touch the snow. It was reported that many trucks
used for plowing were in such poor shape that this was
all that could reasonably be expected of them. The
conditions throughout the City in the days following
the storm confirm these criticisms.
Where the contractors worked removing snow, it was
very evident that their work was motivated more by a
desire to run up a big bill than to do a good job of
clearance. They touched only the easily removable
snow, leaving in many places a hard packed coating
as much as six inches thick, which was not so easy to
remove, for city emergency men to shovel away.
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Routes to dumping places were not adequately
plowed. The traffic tie-up which resulted delayed
snow-loaded trucks, as well as all other traffic. Some
meager effort was made to keep automobiles out of
downtown streets until reasonable clearance was ob-
tained, but little was accomplished in this direction.
The plowed space in most streets was promptly used
for parking cars.
It is obvious that the best possible plan of snow
clearance will not work well unless the execution of the
work is directed with good judgment. The timing of
the plowing is very important. However, the equip-
ment to which the plow is attached must be capable of
pushing the plow through the snow or most of the fee
paid for hire of trucks is wasted. Obstructions like
parked cars only serve to help contractors obtain much
for small accomplishment.
Although the City's record in handling this 1941
storm was far from perfect, it represented a substantial
improvement over the performance of a year ago.
It is to be expected that the lessons learned this year will
bear fruit in the next test.
IV. THE FINANCIAL CONDITION OF THE
CITY.
Inasmuch as the present administrative control in
municipal affairs is entering upon its fourth and final
year, it is timely while giving the financial picture as
it exists at the end of the third year, to show the progress
made during the past four years. Such period will
include one year of the last administration. In some
respects the City is better off than at the beginning
of the present administration. In others, the picture
is not so good. On the whole, the taxpayers, and
particularly those interested in the future of the City,
have much to worry about.
As has been customary for several years, the Com-
mission here offers simply the final figures of mainten-
ance cost, tax collections, property valuations and city
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debt. Little comment is needed on any of these features
of the financial picture. The figures speak for them-
selves.
1. Maintenance Expenses.
Total maintenance cost of city departments, exclu-
sive of the School Department, were higher by over
$600,000 than in any previous year of the present
administration, and higher by $1,600,000 than in the
last year of the preceding administration. Because
many are interested to know how maintenance expenses
have varied in the three years of the present adminis-
tration, and also how they compare with the situation
in the last year of the preceding administration, the
total charges for maintenance for those years are given
herewith.
City Maintenance Expenditures.
1937. 1938. 1939. 1940.
Total Maintenance $39,317,275
12,129,560
27,187,715
$39,787,509
12,919,491
26,868.018
$40,270,840
13,895,799
26,375,040
$40,944,184
14,063,508
26,880,576
Welfare Expenditure Exclusive
of Long Island Hospital Serv-
Maintenance, Exclusive of Wel-
In the foregoing comparison the item marked ^'wel-
fare expenditures" includes disbursement through the
Public Welfare Department for child welfare in the
Institutions Department, through the Soldiers' Relief
Department, and through all departments for the city's
contribution to W. P. A. acti\dties. The expenditure
for maintenance of the infirmary and hospital at Long
Island, and for the central office and the steamers which
serve Long Island are included in the ''Maintenance,
Exclusive of Welfare" item. The picture changes
slightly if allowance is made for an expenditure in 1940
charged to the Institutions Department for a new
dormitory at Long Island, which is a capital expenditure.
The amount so charged was $44,744.55.
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Besides revealing that total maintenance cost is still
rising, other striking features of this exhibit are, first,
that welfare expenditures were higher in 1940 than in
any of the other three years, and, secondly that while
maintenance expense for other municipal service was
less in 1940 than it was in 1937, nevertheless, it was
higher in 1940 than in 1938 or 1939. It will there-
fore be disappointing to many to learn that the gains
made in 1938 and 1939 in reducing maintenance costs,
exclusive of welfare, were wiped out in 1940, and that
welfare cost continued on an upward swing despite
improved general business conditions.
School Maintenance.
Cost of maintenance of the city's educational system
has continued to decUne. In each of the last three
years, the final result was a smaller total cost than in
the year preceding. The amount of these reductions
may be seen in the following figures:
1937. 1938. 1939. 1940.
$17,093,890 $16,712,649 $16,505,426 $16,378,229
The decrease in maintenance cost has been slightly
more than 4 per cent.
During this same period, the total pupil enrollment
of the schools decreased as follows:
Total Enrollment.
1937. 1938. 1939. 1940.
131,635 127,005 123,924 120,447
The decrease in enrollment has been slighth' more
than 8 per cent.
County Maintenance.
The maintenance cost of the County activities, which,
in Suffolk County, are borne entirely by the City of
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Boston with no contribution from Chelsea, Revere and
Winthrop, have shown a $90,000 reduction in 1940 from
the cost in 1939. Nevertheless, they were higher in
1940 than in 1937 or 1938.
The figures of county maintenance follow:
1937. 1938. 1939. 1940.
$3,601,538 $3,583,795 $3,724,485 $3,634,754
In large measure the increase in the cost of mainte-
nance of the enlarged county court house is responsible
for the greater cost in 1940 than in 1937 and in 1938.
Water Service Surplus and Sumner Tunnel
Deficit.
Receipts for water service in 1940 were greater than
the cost of supply, but the surplus was considerably
less than in each of the preceding two years. On the
other hand, the receipts in 1940 from tolls in the Sumner
Tunnel to East Boston continued to show improvement.
Water Service Balance.
The net result of the operation of the water service in
the past four years was as follows:
1937 $54,399.27 — deficit
1938 $654,998 . 45 — surplus
1939 $866,683 . 12— surplus
1940 $418,454 . 34— surplus
The above figures reveal that in each of the past three
years the receipts have been substantially in excess of the
costs. This has provoked the query in the City Council
as to why the water rates should not now be reduced.
Obviously water consumers should not be compelled
to pay more than fair cost, but on the other hand City
officials must not be too hasty in ordering reduction.
Under the statutes, water rates are intended to cover
costs and no more. In fixing the rate to be paid by
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consumers, the City must establish a rate which will
insure the receipt of enough funds to pay cost of dis-
tribution, capital charges, metropolitan water assess-
ment, and all other items properly chargeable to water
consumers. Because all water users do not pay their
bills promptly, and some do not pay them at all, it is
necessary for the Gity to include in the rate charged a
percentage to cover delinquency. Since the actual
delinquency varies from year to year, and much of it is
due to conditions which the City's agents cannot change,
it can be expected that in some years there will be a
surplus and in other years there will be a deficit. If the
rate charged produces a sum greater than the cost, the
surplus can only be used to retire debt. It must first
be applied to water debt which has become due. Any
sum left over may be used to retire any. other city debt.
If the receipts were to continue indefinitely to exceed
the costs as they have done in the last three years,
obviously it would be proper to reduce the rates. But
the receipts of last year for last year's service were not
greater than last year's costs. The total amount
charged water users in 1940 was $4,654,015.22. The
amount received on this account to December 31, 1940,
was $3,591,916. At the end of the fiscal year, therefore,
the amount of the 1940 assessments ' actually received
was more than $1,000,000 short of the total assessment.
The surplus was brought about by the fact that in 1940
more than $1,000,000 was received from water users
who were delinquents at the beginning of the year.
During the past two years extra effort has been made
to collect the over-due charges. To a great extent this
extra effort is responsible for the better financial picture
at the end of each of the last three years. It is note-
worthy that in 1939 when the drive for the collection of
the old accounts was at its peak, the surplus at the end
of the year was more than twice the amount of the
surplus in 1940. It is likely that the surplus at the end
of 1941 will be much less again, if there is any surplus
at all. Old accounts are now pretty well liquidated.
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In the five years previous to 1938 there was a sub-
stantial deficit in each year. The slow accounts of
those years have now been brought up to date in great
part. From now on it will require greater diligence to
make receipts for water meet the costs of supply of it
even if no tendency develops to fall back into the condi-
tion which obtained previous to 1938. Therefore, it
cannot yet be clearly seen that the water rates should be
reduced.
Sumner Tunnel.
The receipts from tolls collected in the Sumner tunnel
came a little nearer meeting cost of operation and
financing charges than in previous years. The situation
at the end of each of the last four years was as follows
:
1937 $453,479 — deficit
1938 S437,808 — deficit
1939 * . $365,045 — deficit
1940 $305,525 — deficit
The receipts in 1940 amounted to $960,384.66.
Operative costs amounted to $229,635.64, and debt
charges to $1,036,254.75, making total charges for
operation and debt of $1,265,909.89. The charges,
therefore, were $305,525.23 in excess of receipts. During
the year, the City received a contribution of $50,000
from the State on account of the deficit in 1939, and
under proposed legislation will receive another contribu-
tion of $50,000 in 1941 on account of the 1940 deficit.
2. Tax Collections.
The City made a substantial gain in collection of
assessments on real and personal property during the
year 1940. In the years previous to the depression, a
total collection as of December 31 of approximately
85 per cent of the current levy was regarded as normal.
During the worst of the depression years, the lowest
level in percentage reached within the similar period was
69.796 per cent. Although collections in 1940 were still
much below the normal percentage. of the pre-depression
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era, yet they were better than in any year since the de-
pression began. The gradual improvement in the past
four years is shown in the following table:
1937. 1938. 1939. 1940.
Levy 861,554,079 $64,031,829 $60,839,759 $60,219,318
Amount of above levy collected $44,884,858 $50,059,439 $47,318,649 $48,306,029
to December 31.
Percentage collected 72.331 77 . 460 77.102 79.512
Amount of earlier levies collected
in.
$9,365,452 $10,549,555 $9,530,959 $9,812,534
Motor vehicle excise tax col- $885,994 $952,138 $877,268 $1,003 636
lected.
As was true in 1939, the total of collections in 1940
suffered from the fact that the City was unable to
collect 70 per cent of the assessments levied on the
South Station property and 100 per cent of those levied
against the Old Colony Railroad and the Boston and
Providence Railroad. Had these assessments been
collected, they would have made a difference of approxi-
mately one per cent in the total collected. A recent
decision of the Supreme Court of the United States
(Palmer v. Webster & Atlas National Bank of Boston,
Trustee, decided February 3, 1941) postpones indefi-
nitely the likelihood of collecting these taxes unpaid on
the South Station property and indicates that the
obligation to pay them rests upon the Boston and
Providence and Old Colony Railroads only. From
the point of view of ever receiving these taxes in cash,
the outlook for the City is not promising.
A striking feature of the above figures is that in
1940 the volume of collections of the current levy was
approximately $1,000,000 more than the volume col-
lected in 1939 of the current levy, although the levy
in 1940 was approximately §600,000 less than the 1939
levy. Other striking features were the larger volume
of taxes assessed in the years previous to 1940 collected
in 1940, and the greater yield from the motor vehicle
excise tax.
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City Valuation.
The total property valuation which was used in
computing the tax rate again decUned in 1940. It
was the tenth year in succession in which the property
valuation was less than in the preceding year, the
all-time high having been reached in 1930 when the
figures were $1,972,148,200. The progress downward of
valuation figures in the last four years has been as
follows
:
1937. 1938. 1939. 1940.
$1,590,544,700 $1,550,407,500 $1,524,806,000 $1,483,234,500
The reduction in 1940 was the largest in any of the
four years shown. As a matter of fact, it was the
largest reduction since 1934. In the opinion of many
competent authorities, valuations on the whole are still
too high and will be substantially reduced as the State
Board of Tax Appeals continues to file decisions on
pending cases. Abatements granted by the assessors or
ordered by the State Board of Tax Appeal after the tax
rate was declared reduced the valuation used in tax
rate computation by approximately $5,300,000, which
compares with similar reductions in 1939 of approxi-
mately $9,000,000.
The total of warrants and appropriations used in the
tax rate computation was less in 1940 than in 1939 by
approximately $520,000, which accounts to that extent
for the reduction of approximately $620,000 in the
total amount to be raised by taxation which has been
previously shown in this report.
New construction authorized by permit from the
Building Department, according to the values as given
in applications, amounted to $7,006,527. While this
total was almost $1,000,000 greater than the correspond-
ing total of 1938, it was over $6,000,000 less than the
corresponding total of 1939.
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This substantial decrease is attributed to the fact
that the 1939 figures included the valuations of four
housing projects for which permits were issued in that
year. The 1940 figures include the valuation of only
one additional housing project. Without the lift given
in these calculations by the Federal Housing Projects
for which permits were given in 1939, the figures of
valuation of new construction in that year would have
been $10,500,000 less than the gross total valuation.
The valuation as given in the application for a permit
for the one housing project of 1940 was $744,413.
Analyzing these figures reveals that building by private
parties, as shown by the applications for permits filed,
was approximately 125 per cent greater in 1940 than in
1939.
City Debt.
The city debt situation continued to show improve-
ment. The net outstanding obligations on December
31, 1940 were almost $6,000,000 less than on the corre-
sponding date in 1939. The figures of outstanding net
obligations follows:
1937. 1938. 1939. 1940.
$130,156,000
23,000,000
7,260,000
$132,990,717
' 14,000,000
8,863,065
$131,425,837
12,500,000
7,627,051
$127,751,156
11,000,000
6,919,859Tax title loans
$160,416,000 $155,853,782 $151,552,888 $145,671,015
The above figures include the Suffolk County debt,
w^hich Boston alone pays, and the water, traffic tunnel,
and rapid transit debt.
The relation of the net debt, exclusive of enterprise
debt, to assessed valuation was 4.52 per cent in 1940, a
reduction of only .07 of 1 per cent from the 1939 figure.
In the year 1929, when the depression began, the rela-
tion was 2.99 per cent. Valuations have steadily de-
clined in the past 10 years, while net debt has increased
almost $10,000,000.
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The relation of the total net debt (city, county, and
enterprise debt included) on December 31, 1940, to
1940 valuation was 8.61 per cent as compared with
8.62 per cent in 1939 and 5.23 per cent in 1929.
Although the net debt burden the City is now carry-
ing is approximately $8,000,000 less than when the peak
was reached in 1933, the wealth of the City as expressed
in assessments on taxable property has decreased
$300,000,000 in the same period.
In 1940, the City retired bonded debt in the amount
of $9,906,000.
In 1941, the amount coming due totals $9,558,000.
Mr. Lasker approves this report insofar as it is not
inconsistent with his minority report of the investigation
of the Police Department.
The reports adopted by the Commission in 1940
follow:
1. Feb. 7, 1940. To the Governor of the Commonwealth. Relative
to the authority and duties of the numerous
officials having jurisdiction over Charles Street
Jail and recommending that an over-hauling of
the statutes be undertaken so that the extent of
responsibility on individual officials may be
clearly defined.
2. March 27, 1940. To the Mayor and City Council regarding the work
performed by the City's agencies in clearance of
city streets after the St. Valentine's Day snow-
storm.
3. April 29, 1940. To the Lieutenant Governor of the Commonwealth.
Regarding the propriety of the deficit payment to
the Boston Elevated Railway Company.
4. May 22,1940. To the Mayor. Recommending that the laundering
service for the City be consolidated under the
control of the Park Department in the present
city hospital plant.
5. June 19, 1940. To the Mayor. Relating to the cost of the police
department in Boston and showing (1) the
relation of that cost to the cost of other public
service in Boston and (2) a comparison of the
police cost in Boston with the cost in the eight
other leading cities of the country.
6. Aug. 19, 1940. To the City Council. Regarding a permit for a
poultry slaughterhouse at No. 11 Lewis Street,
East Boston,
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7. Aug. 28, 1940. To the Mayor. Regarding a contract to C. J.
McCarty & Company, Inc., for the purchase of
an Ingersoll-Rand compressor for the Traffic
Department.
8. Dec. 30, 1940. To the Mayor. Regarding the cost of poHce
service in the City of Boston and discussing the
organization of the PoHce Department under a
single police commissioner.
Respectfully submitted,
Charles M. Storey, Chairman,
James E. Maguire,
David Lasker,
James H. Flanagan,
Elias F. Shamon,
The Finance Commission.
Robert E. Cunniff,
Secretary
